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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The underrepresentation of women in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) is a familiar problem, but the reasoning behind this gender gap is 
the subject of ongoing study.  Although the gender gap in STEM subjects among students 
has been closing (Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006; Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams, 
2008), discrepancies remain on high-stakes exams such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test, 
Graduate Record Exam, and Advanced Placement tests.  On these tests, males out-
perform females consistently in science and mathematics (Halpern et al., 2007; Lubinski 
& Benbow, 2008).  It is under the pressure and anxiety of such major diagnostic 
evaluations that male and female students begin to separate, with women falling behind.  
These gender differences on critical exams are mirrored in the continuing gender gap in 
college major selection.  Although women are more likely than men to earn a college 
degree (Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006), there has been little change in female participation 
in STEM areas, where males typically dominate (Legewie & DiPrete, 2011).  
Specifically, men are significantly more likely to select engineering, computer science, 
and mathematics as a college major than are women (Peter & Horn, 2005). 
Gender differences in college major selection also translate to fewer women in 
STEM careers.  For example, women only make up 5.9% of mechanical engineers and 
29.5% of environmental scientists (US Department of Labor, 2010).  This pattern holds in 
academia as well, where 92% of engineering professors and 87% of computer science 
professors are male (National Science Foundation, 2004).  What are the driving forces 
behind this ongoing gender disparity?  
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One explanation for this continuing gender gap is a cultural environment in which 
gender stereotypes are particularly pervasive and influence not only perceptions of male 
and female ability in STEM areas, but also students’ performance in these domains.  The 
stereotype that “math is male”, for example, has recently been shown to be acquired as 
early as second grade (Cvencek, Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 2011).  Not only did young 
students associate math with male, but female elementary students had a much weaker 
identification with math than did males even at this early age.  Studies such as this one 
indicate that the gender stereotypes related to STEM domains are understood very early 
and may then contribute to performance on high-stakes exams as well as interest in 
STEM fields later in life, where STEM gender stereotypes persist (Nosek & Smyth, 
2011; Nosek et al., 2009).  The internalization of such gender stereotypes can have severe 
consequences that lead to disengagement from the domain.  In order to preserve self-
esteem, it is common for individuals to selectively place less value on domains for which 
their group is stereotyped (Crocker & Major, 1989; Nieva & Gutek, 1981).  Therefore, 
the pervasiveness gender STEM stereotypes can lead to disengagement from an early 
age, resulting in the gender disparities observed throughout secondary education and in 
the work force. 
In general, stereotypes can be debilitating in terms of performance and are 
influential in the gender STEM problem.  Specifically, the phenomenon of stereotype 
threat can be strong enough to inhibit performance in several different domains, including 
important diagnostic tests such as the SAT and GRE that students pursuing these fields 
must take. 
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Stereotype Threat 
 Stereotype threat is defined as “the concrete, real-time threat of being judged and 
treated poorly in settings where a negative stereotype about one’s group applies (Steele, 
Spencer, & Aronson, 2002, p. 389).”  Feeling threatened by a salient stereotype about 
one’s group can hinder performance in different domains compared to when no 
stereotype threat is present.   
Stereotype threat effects have been observed with various social groups and with 
many different skills.  For example, athletic performance of White participants was 
impaired compared to Blacks when a sports task was defined as diagnostic of natural 
ability (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999).  In this case, White participants were 
threatened by the negative stereotype that Whites as a group are less skillful in athletics 
than are Blacks, which subsequently interfered with their ability to perform well. 
Useful skills for the workplace are also affected by stereotype threat.  Men’s 
ability to decode nonverbal cues showed impaired performance when they were told this 
was a test of social sensitivity, on which women generally score higher (Koenig & Eagly, 
2005).  The stereotype that women are more sensitive and understanding served as a 
threat to the male participants, showing that stereotype threat can occur even with 
typically non-marginalized groups.  Similarly, women’s ability to negotiate successfully 
was impaired when gender was made salient, indicating that females had an existing 
stereotype of men as superior negotiators (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2001). 
Perhaps the most often studied form of stereotype threat is in intellectual or 
academic domains.  This research began with experiments showing that the possibility of 
confirming a negative racial stereotype about intellectual ability impaired Black students’ 
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performance on difficult verbal reasoning and math tests (Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 
1998; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995).  This effect was observed even when 
individual skills and level of preparation were accounted for, indicating that although the 
two racial groups were equally qualified, the negative stereotype present at the time of 
the test was enough to impair performance.  This effect has been replicated with different 
tasks as well as with different target groups. 
White males who were highly identified with and proficient in math experienced 
impaired performance on a math test when comparisons were made with Asians, who are 
stereotyped as exceling in mathematics (Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & 
Brown, 1998; Smith & White, 2002). Furthermore, when a difficult math test was 
described as producing gender differences, women performed much worse than men even 
though the two groups were equally qualified (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Walsh, 
Hickey, & Duffy, 1999).  This effect was also shown with young girls whose 
performance was hindered when gender was made salient before a math test (Ambady, 
Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001).  Through these many stereotype threat studies, specific 
components have been identified that must be in place for stereotype threat effects to 
occur. 
Stereotype Threat Contingencies 
 In order for a stereotype to pose a threat and affect one’s performance, the 
situation must be one in which the stereotype is applicable (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 
2002).  For example, a difficult math test creates a situation in which the gender and math 
achievement stereotype applies.  Performance must also be relevant to the stereotyped 
group; that is, the stereotype has to be specific to the task at hand, not a stereotype that is 
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indirectly tied to achievement (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999).  Furthermore, stereotype 
threat effects emerge more often when the tests are characterized as diagnostic of ability.  
In this case, the target has an investment in performing well on the task, making the 
stereotype particularly influential on his/her performance expectations. 
 Domain identification is the degree to which one’s self-regard depends on the 
outcomes one experiences in the domain (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  The more 
identified one is with the domain of interest, the more influence the stereotype will have 
on performance. It is necessary to establish domain identification by connecting the 
particular task with a field of study or a skill that is particularly important to the 
individual.  Similar to the necessity of test diagnosticity, high domain identification 
makes the test something the individual sees as important, increasing motivation to 
perform well.  If the motivation to perform well is absent, outcomes in the presence of 
stereotype threat will not differ from outcomes when there is no stereotype threat present. 
 It is important for individuals to be highly identified with the group to which the 
stereotype applies.  One’s identity must be directly linked to the stereotype itself, or else 
it loses its applicability to that individual (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  In the case 
of gender stereotypes, group membership is often made salient simply by indicating 
gender before the task.  This reminder of group membership leads the individual to think 
about how his/her membership in the stereotyped group will affect how they perform on 
the upcoming task (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). 
 Finally, the difficulty of the test is often a critical component of stereotype threat.  
When the test is difficult, the individual may experience increased pressure and 
frustration.  These elements are then likely to lead to more thoughts about the 
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implications of the negative stereotype about their group, which may affect performance.  
Stereotype threat effects have been observed with both highly difficult (Croizet & Claire, 
1998; Schmader, 2002; Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002) and moderately 
difficult tests (Lawrence, Marks, & Jackson, 2010). 
 The stereotype threat phenomenon has been shown in several different capacities 
with different target groups, but what are the causal mechanisms that lead to these 
performance decrements? 
Causal Explanations for Stereotype Threat Effects 
 There are different factors that may mediate the relationship between stereotype 
threat and performance.  The threat of confirming a negative stereotype can cause 
anxiety, which influences one’s ability to perform adequately.  Stereotype threat may also 
lower one’s expectations of success and lead to a decrease in task specific self-efficacy.  
Finally, the attributional information implied by stereotypes may influence the degree to 
which the threat negatively impacts performance. 
 Anxiety and Working Memory. In a stereotype threat situation, the focus is 
taken away from the task at hand because of one’s anxiety in disconfirming the 
threatened stereotype (Schmader & Johns, 2003; Steele, 1997; Steele, Spencer, & 
Aronson, 2002).  Working memory is being used to suppress thoughts of the stereotype 
and avoid confirming it, instead of being dedicated to task performance (Beilock, Rydell, 
& McConnell, 2007).  One study found that anxiety partially mediated the relationship 
between stereotype threat and performance in a nationally representative sample 
(Osborne, 2001).  Furthermore, anxiety due to stereotype salience leads to lowered ability 
to regulate behavior and attention resources.  When the stereotype is nullified, however, 
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behavior can be regulated effectively and performance is not affected (Inzlicht, McKay, 
& Aronson, 2006; Smith & White, 2002). 
 Performance Expectancies. Stereotype threat situations cause participants to 
lower their expectations of success, compromising individuals’ belief in their ability to do 
well (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001).  This process can lead to the negative impact 
on performance often observed in response to stereotype threat.  Lowered performance 
expectancies following stereotype threat have also been observed after participants 
received positive feedback on a previous trial of the test (Stangor, Carr, and Kiang, 
1998).  These results indicate that regardless of past performance, stereotype threat was 
capable of decreasing expectancies for a future task.  Although the findings regarding 
expectancies as a mediator between stereotype threat and performance have been 
inconsistent (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002), it is possible that this variable plays 
more of a role in situations where the task is more ambiguous or moderately difficult, 
making reliance on outside information (i.e., the negative stereotype) more likely. 
Attributions 
Attributions have historically been critical in understanding achievement, but they 
should also be a primary focus in the study of stereotype threat and STEM performance. 
The current research seeks to integrate attributions and stereotype threat to better 
understand the role of stereotypes in the STEM gender gap.  In order to achieve this, it is 
necessary to review attribution theory itself as well as how attributions serve as a causal 
explanation in stereotype threat. 
 Attribution theory proposed by Heider (1944; 1958) provided a model for how 
people gain control of their environment by understanding the causes of behaviors or 
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outcomes.  Specifically, Heider introduced two attributional dimensions: locus (internal; 
external) and stability (stable; unstable).  Weiner (1979; 1984; 1985) introduced a third 
dimension of controllability, which focuses on to whom the responsibility is assigned for 
a certain behavior or outcome. 
The study of attributions has continued since being introduced by Heider and 
Weiner through many different constructs and paradigms.  Specifically, attributions have 
been linked to several factors that are influenced by stereotype threat, including 
performance, persistence, and self-efficacy.  In the following section, a review of the 
literature regarding the role of attributions in these dimensions as well as an integration of 
attributions and stereotypes will be discussed.  This deconstruction of the multi-faceted 
influence of attributions will allow further exploration of the combined role of 
stereotypes and attributions on factors that contribute to the current gender gap in STEM 
domains. 
Attributions and Performance 
 In one study, an attributional intervention was introduced to retrain students to 
attribute academic difficulties to unstable factors (Wilson & Linville, 1982).  This change 
in attributional perspective resulted in higher GPAs and better performance on sample 
GRE items.  Therefore, students who saw their troubles as unstable, or susceptible to 
change, were much more likely to succeed than those who did not undergo the attribution 
intervention.  In a similar, more recent attribution intervention study, fewer instances of 
failure in a psychology course were observed in a group of students whose attributions 
for failure were reframed as having controllable causes (Stewart, Clifton, Daniels, Perry, 
Chipperfield, & Ruthig, 2011).  Specifically, researchers trained students to view poor 
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performance as a result of effort and strategy (controllable) rather than ability or 
intelligence (uncontrollable).  These studies demonstrate that the attributions of different 
behaviors or outcomes can significantly influence performance. 
Attributions and Persistence 
 Persistence is also influenced by attributions and is closely tied to one’s 
performance in a given domain, particularly the likelihood that disengagement will occur 
over the long term (Weiner, 2010).  In a series of achievement tasks, participants were 
more likely to persist in the face of failure when attributions were unstable (e.g., luck; 
effort) than when they were stable (Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972).  The 
instability of the performance indicates that future performance may lead to more 
favorable outcomes, making persistence valuable. 
 Differences in persistence also emerge when participants derive their own 
attributions for performance outcomes.  Those who are higher in achievement motivation 
persist longer given failure because they attribute failures to lack of effort.  In contrast, 
those who have low motivation attribute failure to an ability deficiency, leading to lower 
rates of persistence (Weiner & Kukla, 1970).  The effort attribution can be characterized 
as internal, controllable, and unstable, indicating that future behavior may yield better 
results, leading to greater persistence.  Ability deficiency is internal, uncontrollable, and 
stable, which indicates a permanency that is likely to apply to future performance, 
making those who apply this attribution less willing to persist following failure. 
Attributions and Self-Efficacy 
 Different attributions for success or failure can be used as tools to enhance and 
protect self-efficacy for those who are motivated to perform well.  For example, those 
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who attributed failure in a foreign language course to effort had higher self-efficacy than 
those who did not make effort attributions (Hsieh & Schallert, 2008).  This indicates that 
effort as an internal, controllable, unstable attribution is protecting self-efficacy by 
implying that, due to the temporally inconsistent nature of the failure, it can be reversed 
in future circumstances.  Furthermore, self-efficacy is enhanced when success is 
attributed to stable factors, such that successes are viewed as consistent and therefore 
improve self-esteem (Simon & Feather, 1973).  Similarly, attributing failure to more 
unstable factors is a self-esteem defense strategy, so that the failure seems to be as a 
result of a fluke or momentary disadvantage, not due to something that will persist over 
time (Simon & Feather, 1973). 
Attributions and Stereotypes 
  Attributions and stereotypes have also been linked because of their symmetrical 
impact on performance, persistence, and self-efficacy.  Some research has explored 
attributions and stereotypes simultaneously, specifically in stereotype threat paradigms.   
Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2006) investigated the reduction of performance-based 
stereotype threat effects by manipulating attributions for gender differences.  When 
gender differences between men and women in math performance were said to be 
malleable rather than fixed, stereotype threat effects were reduced. This study 
demonstrated that when the salient stereotype is thought to be unstable and changeable 
(e.g., effort-based), it does not pose a threat to the stereotyped group as it does when 
gender differences are attributed to fixed factors (e.g., ability). 
 In another study that investigated attributions in the context of racial intelligence 
stereotypes, researchers manipulated attributions for intelligence itself; with one group 
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told that intelligence is malleable (i.e., internal, controllable, unstable) rather than fixed 
(i.e., internal, uncontrollable, stable; Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002).  African American 
participants who viewed intelligence as malleable exhibited better performance than 
those in the other conditions as well as greater enjoyment of the task.  Although this 
study does combine attributions and stereotypes, it does not deal with the attributions 
related to the stereotype itself, but rather the content of the stereotype: intelligence. 
 When a stereotype that men are better than women in math was attributed to 
natural ability (internal, uncontrollable) or when no specific threat was presented 
(implicit stereotype), women exhibited impaired math performance (Thoman, White, 
Yamawaki, & Koishi, 2008).  However, when the same stereotype was attributed to effort 
(internal, controllable), the stereotype threat performance effects were substantially 
decreased.  This study provides preliminary support for the idea that the attributional 
information within the stereotype can be instrumental in the stereotype threat process, but 
does not explore the full breadth of attribution combinations. 
 It is clear that both stereotypes and attributions can influence performance as well 
as other psychological variables, but where do attributions and stereotypes intersect?  
Something that is missing in the current literature is how stereotypes themselves convey 
attributional information and how that information can be the driving force in influencing 
performance differences, particularly between men and women in STEM domains. 
Attributional Model of Stereotypes 
 The attributional model of stereotypes provides a structure from which to study 
attributions in the context of stereotypes themselves in order to better understand how the 
stereotype attribution package works to influence performance.  This model integrates the 
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three dimensions of traditional attribution theory (stability, controllability, and locus) and 
how they apply to stereotypes specifically (Brandt & Reyna, 2011; Henry, Reyna, & 
Weiner, 2004; Reyna, 2000; Reyna, 2008). 
 Theoretically, the stability dimension remains constant in the context of 
stereotypes due to the relatively stable nature of stereotypes themselves (Anderson, Krull, 
& Weiner, 1996).  Therefore, with stability relatively unchanged there are three 
overarching combinations of the remaining two attribution dimensions, locus and 
controllability, that may be conveyed through a given stereotype. 
 An internal, controllable attribution combination is largely effort-based.  In the 
context of the gender gap in academic achievement, this stereotype attribution would 
imply that if women put in as much effort as men do, they would be equally successful in 
STEM areas (e.g., “women do not measure up to men in STEM domains because they do 
not try as hard as men do”). The perceived controllability of the outcome may inspire 
motivation and persistence.  Because success is based on effort, more effort would be 
exerted to obtain the desired outcome.  This would also manifest in greater persistence, 
even during a struggle.  In this case, self-esteem would not necessarily be threatened 
because even if success is not achieved immediately, this attribution implies that the 
individual is in control of her success and therefore can eventually meet the desired goal. 
 An ability-based stereotype attribution has internal, uncontrollable causes, which 
implies that the individual is incapable of reversing the given stereotype.  Whereas the 
internal, controllable attribution could potentially lead to disengagement and harm to self-
esteem, a stereotype implying internal, uncontrollable causes has more immediate effects.  
In this case, the stereotype would convey that regardless of the amount of effort women 
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invest, they will not be able to perform as well as men in STEM areas because they lack 
the necessary inherent ability that men have.  This attributional stereotype is particularly 
debilitating because of the permanency implied by the attribution, leading to little 
motivation to persist in the task or domain cited in the stereotype from the outset.  The 
ability-based implication is also more likely to compromise self-esteem immediately, 
which influences performance as well. 
 The final attributional stereotype is the external, uncontrollable combination.  
This attribution implies that the individual is not at fault for female underperformance, 
but systemic inequities have held women back in math and are responsible for the gender 
difference stereotype.  This attribution information may cause the individual to exhibit 
anger and disapproval of the social institutions and culture that remain outside of their 
control, but are seemingly to blame for their inequality compared to men in terms of 
STEM achievement.  Negative outcomes are blamed on external factors, so self-esteem is 
preserved in this case.  However, if changing or overcoming the stereotype seems too 
overwhelming given the societal context, withdrawal may result as in the other attribution 
combinations. 
 This model provides a direct link between stereotypes about female 
underperformance in STEM domains and the attributions that seem to play a role in the 
current disparities observed between men and women in these areas.  With this model at 
the center, it is possible to take a more detailed approach while simultaneously exploring 
a broader range of attributional possibilities that could be contributing to the gender gap.  
Rationale 
 
 
14
Although previous research has investigated the role of attributions in stereotype 
threat performance effects, some questions remain unexplored.  What is necessary to 
bridge the gaps between previous studies is the use of all possible stereotype attributions 
so that the specific influence of each can be examined.  In the past, researchers have 
focused, for example, on effort-based performance attributions compared to ability-based, 
but have not explored the society-based reasoning implied by the external, uncontrollable 
stereotype.  Therefore, one goal of this study is to incorporate all three of these 
attributional signatures in order to gain perspective into how each of them differentially 
influences performance as well as persistence and task-based self esteem.  The 
attributional model of stereotypes fosters this comprehensive investigation of stereotype 
attributions, allowing a better understanding of how attributions contribute to 
performance deficits often seen in the face of stereotype threat. 
Another primary goal of the current research is to incorporate each causal 
attribution in the context of the stereotype itself.  Whereas past studies have included 
attributions for other factors such as intelligence (i.e., intelligence is fixed and cannot be 
changed), the aim of the current study is to connect the attribution to the stereotype (i.e., 
women are poor at logical reasoning compared to men because they lack the necessary 
innate ability).  Although these two examples imply an internal, uncontrollable 
attribution, the latter relates specifically to the stereotype that women do not measure up 
to men in logical reasoning.  In contrast, the former is relating to intelligence, which is a 
peripheral factor that is not tied directly to the stereotype.  By using an attributional 
stereotype, a more direct link will be made between the two rather than requiring an 
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inference to be made between the attribution of a related factor and the relevant 
stereotype. 
This research will also add a new perspective by making use of a task that is 
attributionally flexible to be able to measure not only how the attribution information 
influences participants’ willingness to persist on a task, but also to identify instances of 
attribution changes or adaptations that serve to protect self-efficacy.  Previous studies 
have primarily focused on how math tasks relate to the current STEM gender gap, but the 
literature is lacking in the use of other skills that can be convincingly applied to STEM 
domains.  Also needed is a task novel enough to introduce attributions that do not already 
have a history in a given individual.  With math tasks, most individuals presumably enter 
the study with a highly developed domain-specific self-efficacy as well as attributions for 
instances of success or failure based on many different experiences with mathematics 
over their lifetime.  Specifically, higher individual perceptions of capability may deflect 
the application of the stereotype to oneself (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  In a 
more attributionally flexible task such as logical reasoning, perceptions of capability are 
being shaped by the task at hand, not by one’s history of past performances.  Therefore, it 
is expected that the attributional information conveyed through stereotypes will actually 
influence performance and new attributions may be adopted to adequately explain or 
reconcile task success or failure. 
In this study, participants will be randomly assigned to one of four conditions: a 
stereotype implying an internal, controllable attribution (I/C), a stereotype implying an 
internal, uncontrollable attribution (I/UC), a stereotype implying an external 
uncontrollable attribution (E/UC), and a nullified stereotype condition.  The stereotype 
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will state that women do not perform as well as men in the logical reasoning skill being 
tested here.  Before completing the test, participants’ task self-efficacy will be measured.  
After the test, participants will be given the option to earn extra credit, which will act as a 
persistence measure.  Finally task self-efficacy and domain identification will be 
measured again to see if any differences within and between groups emerged as a result 
of the attribution conditions. 
In the internal, controllable condition, participants will be told that women do not 
perform as well as men on tests of logical reasoning because women do not try as hard as 
men and do not put forth the same amount of effort as men do on logical reasoning tasks.  
The internal, uncontrollable condition will state the women do not perform as well as 
men because women do not have the necessary innate abilities that men have.  In 
contrast, the external, uncontrollable attribution states that women do not perform as well 
as men because girls grow up getting less attention and encouragement in logical thinking 
than do boys.  Finally, in the nullified stereotype condition, participants will be told that 
there are no gender differences in performance of logical reasoning tests. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I. Participants will differ in performance based on attribution 
condition such that those in the nullified stereotype and internal/controllable conditions 
will have the highest levels of performance followed by those in the 
external/uncontrollable group and the internal/uncontrollable group.  
Hypothesis II. Participants will differ in persistence based on attribution condition 
such that those in the nullified stereotype and internal/controllable conditions will have 
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the highest levels of persistence followed by those in the external/uncontrollable group 
and the internal/uncontrollable group. 
Specifically, it is expected that women in the nullified stereotype condition will 
be helped by learning that no gender differences exist on this task and will therefore not 
have the worry of confirming a negative stereotype.  For this reason, participants in this 
condition are expected to have the best performance as well as persistence out of the four 
experimental groups.  The internal/controllable (effort-based) group is expected to be 
comparable to the nullified stereotype group in terms of both performance and 
persistence.  It is predicted that effort will be put forth by these participants to do well 
given the controllability implied by the stereotype, making them focused on performing 
well.  For the same reason, those in the I/C condition are also expected to persist on the 
experimental task with a frequency similar to that seen in the nullified stereotype group in 
order to earn extra credit points.   
These two reactions are different from that expected of participants in the 
internal/uncontrollable (ability-based) condition, who are led to believe that gender 
differences in performance are something out of their control.  Because the stereotype is 
thought to be unchangeable despite any effort they may apply, their performance will not 
reflect the motivation and effort seen in the I/C group.  Instead, this group may be 
discouraged by the finality and immutability implied by the stereotype and therefore may 
be less willing to put forth effort.  This will be observed in their weaker performance as 
well as in their lower rate of persistence in the task compared to the I/C and nullified 
stereotype groups. 
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The temporal limitations of this study make it difficult to simulate the frequent 
real world discrimination messages that are critical to the external, uncontrollable 
(society-based) attribution implied by the stereotype.  A message implying environmental 
barriers may prevent participants from making low ability attributions, but at the same 
time may not point to effort as a viable path to success.  Given the novel environment of 
the experimental setting, it is difficult to predict how participants will interpret the 
negative stereotype with this external attribution.  Previous research has shown that an 
external attribution may act as a buffer and therefore be less impactful in terms of 
performance.  For this reason, it is likely that participants in this E/UC condition will fall 
somewhere between those in the I/C and I/UC conditions by putting forth more effort 
than those in the I/UC condition while exhibiting persistence levels comparable to or 
somewhat lower than those of the I/C condition. 
Hypothesis III.   Participants will differ in self-efficacy based on the attribution 
conditions such that those in the nullified stereotype condition will maintain the highest 
level of self-efficacy at the post-test, followed by those in the I/C (effort-based) 
condition, the E/UC (society-based) group, and lastly, the I/UC (ability-based) condition. 
Hypothesis IV.     Participants will differ in level of domain identification based 
on the attribution conditions such that those in the nullified stereotype condition will 
maintain the highest level of domain identification at the post-test, followed by those in 
the I/C (effort-based) condition, the E/UC (society-based) group, and lastly, the I/UC 
(ability-based) condition. 
Participants in the nullified stereotype group are expected to maintain the task-
based self-esteem and domain identification that they report at the pre-test.  A similar 
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pattern is thought to occur with those in the I/C condition, whose self efficacy and 
domain identification may remain unchanged.  Participants in this case will be focused on 
applying the effort that is implied as necessary to combat the stereotype and would not 
necessarily consider poor performance on the task a reflection of their own ability, but 
rather something that could be improved with more opportunities to exercise a sufficient 
amount of effort. 
Those in the I/UC condition are expected to show lowered self-efficacy at the 
post-test because of the lack of control implied by the attribution.  Because the task is 
difficult and requires more time than is available, participants will struggle to do well on 
the test and may feel that they have no control in avoiding poor performance, which may 
impair self-efficacy.  Unlike in the I/C condition where the negative impact of the effort-
based attribution would not lead to disidentification in an immediate time period, the 
I/UC attribution implies that there is no remedy for the negative stereotype and therefore 
is more likely to lead to not only lowered self-efficacy but also greater likelihood of 
disidentification in the short term.  This disidentification may result as a mechanism for 
protecting self-esteem by minimizing the importance of the domain, in this case logical 
reasoning. 
Self-efficacy in the E/UC (society-based) condition may not be threatened 
because the attribution implies that the individual is not to blame for any shortcomings in 
this domain.  Because the blame is outside of the individual, it is unlikely that self-esteem 
would be affected and is therefore expected to stay consistent regardless of task 
performance.  This is different from the other two attributional stereotype conditions 
where the attributions imply an internal cause that may directly affect self-esteem.  
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However, the potential of disidentification is present if participants view logical 
reasoning as a skill that society does not value for women.  In that case, disidentification 
would coincide with undermining the importance of the domain as something that is not 
worth pursuing because of its insignificance in society (see Appendix A for an overview 
of the hypotheses). 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants were 72 female undergraduates recruited from the DePaul University 
psychology subject pool.  Participants had an average age of 20 years (SD = 4) and were 
mostly first-year students.  All participants read an information sheet describing the study 
and giving participants the right to leave the study at any time without penalty.  All 
participants received partial course credit for their participation.  A female experimenter 
administered the study, but there was a male confederate present during all sessions.  This 
acted as a situational cue to further connect the female participants’ gender with the given 
stereotype and to prevent a feeling of solidarity that may arise in a room of all women 
and no men. 
Procedure 
The researcher began by presenting the logical reasoning task, framing it as 
representative of an important skill that is crucial for success in several disciplines 
including psychology.  This was necessary to ensure that a broad variety of domains with 
which the students may identify will be ostensibly related to this logical reasoning skill 
being tested.  The researcher continued by explaining how more research is needed to 
decipher how people perform on this task because it is instrumental in such a wide 
variety of domains.   
Domain Identification 
Next, participants were given a survey measuring domain identification.  Domain 
identification was measured by asking how participants felt about logical reasoning in 
general and how it relates to different parts of their life.  The items used are adaptations 
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from those created by Smith & White (2001).  The original items were modified in order 
to specifically relate to the logical reasoning domain as opposed to the math and English 
domains for which the scale was originally created (Cronbach’s α = .78).  For example, 
participants  rate how much they agree with the following statement: “Having strong 
logical reasoning skills is important for my discipline.”  All items were also modified to 
follow the 7-point scale format consistent with other scales used in this study (Appendix 
B).  Previous research has demonstrated that high identification with the task domain 
leads to a higher likelihood of being influenced by stereotype threat effects (Steele, 
Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  Therefore, the connection between one’s degree 
concentration and logical reasoning must be made so that the stereotype later presented is 
more likely to influence behavior. 
Attribution Manipulation 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.  
Three of the conditions presented the stereotype that males exhibit better performance 
than females on this logical reasoning task, but the attributional information varied: 
internal/controllable (effort: try harder); internal/uncontrollable (ability: innate, 
biological, genetic differences); external/uncontrollable (structure: preferential treatment, 
societal expectations).  Participants in the final condition were presented with a nullified 
stereotype stating that men and women do not differ on tests of logical reasoning. 
 The attributional stereotype information was embedded within an article given to 
participants, which they read silently to themselves (Appendix C).  These articles were 
largely constructed based on a popular science article regarding gender and math skills 
(Tenenbaum, 2010).  Each of the four articles was modified to convey a message 
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consistent with the condition to which it corresponds.  Therefore, three of the articles 
suggest that women are worse than men in logical reasoning skills but provide different 
reasoning depending on the stereotype attribution, while the fourth article concludes that 
gender differences do not exist (nullified stereotype). 
After reading these articles, participants were asked some questions to ensure that the 
manipulation presented in the article was successfully administered (Appendix D): 
“According to the article, have gender differences in logical reasoning been found?”  
Participants also responded to standard demographic questions including gender in order 
to make this variable salient as a necessary component of the stereotype threat paradigm 
(Appendix E).  
Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy (task based self-esteem) was then measured to determine how 
confident participants felt about their ability to complete the upcoming task after reading 
the research article provided.  These items are adapted from the performance category of 
the State Self Esteem Scale (SSES; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).  Items were amended 
slightly to refer specifically to the experimental task rather than to performance in general 
(Cronbach’s α = .82).  For example, “I feel confident about my logical reasoning 
abilities”.  Each of the 5 items is scored on a 7-point scale and can be found in Appendix 
F. 
Task Performance 
 The majority of previous research on stereotype threat in academic settings has 
focused on mathematics.  In the current study, one goal was to use a test that is different 
but still representative of the STEM domains, adding to the non-mathematics oriented 
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stereotype threat literature.  The task for this study was a test of logical reasoning ability 
using questions taken from a Graduate Record Exam preparation book (Bobrow, 2000; 
Appendix G). 
The test was administered in a way that made it nearly impossible for participants 
to complete all of the items within the given amount of time (20 minutes).  Combined 
with the difficulty of the test, it is possible that this time limit created anxiety and 
inhibited participants’ performance.  Although the questions are not from an actual exam 
from the Educational Testing Service, the questions are representative of the difficulty 
and type that would have been found in the logical reasoning section of the GRE at that 
time (Benbow, 2000).   
When the testing time was up, the researchers collected participants’ answer 
sheets and then gave them an option to earn more points and improve their score by 
continuing to work on the test.  The researcher allowed participants seven minutes to 
continue the test while she graded the initial test items (participants did not know they 
were being timed at this point).  Those participants who chose not to persist simply sat at 
their desk and waited for further instruction.  Persistence was measured with a continuous 
item: “If you could continue on this task, how much would you like to?”  In addition, the 
number of additional items attempted and answered correctly was examined to determine 
how much participants persisted on the task. 
 Performance was assessed by accuracy (i.e., number correct divided by number 
attempted) as well as by the number of correct answers.  Previous research has suggested 
that accuracy is a better measure of performance and may be more likely to reveal 
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stereotype threat effects (Lawrence, Marks, & Jackson, 2010; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 
1999).  
Exit Survey 
 Following the additional testing time, all participants completed a second survey.  
In this post-task measure, participants completed a self-efficacy measure similar to the 
measure used before the test, but modified to be consistent with a retrospective evaluation 
of performance (Cronbach’s α = .89).  A global self-esteem measure was also included 
(Rosenberg, 1965) to examine whether self-esteem in general was influenced by the task 
or manipulations (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
 There were also items measuring how participants perceived logical reasoning 
ability (e.g., “Logical reasoning is something you are born with.”).  Participants may have 
coped with the stereotype by discounting or disagreeing with the conclusions of the 
article.  It is also possible that participants may have protected self-esteem by 
disengaging from logical reasoning as an important skill or from their own discipline.  
The degree of enjoyment experienced by the participants was also measured as the nature 
of the logical reasoning problems may have made them feel more relaxed despite the high 
degree of difficulty.  All items to be included in the exit survey can be found in Appendix 
H. 
 After collecting all of the participant responses, the researchers gave a verbal 
debriefing of the experiment, including positive feedback regarding participants’ test 
performance.  This served to assuage any negative feelings participants may have been 
experiencing following this very difficult test.  Researchers also emphasized that the 
stereotype information in the articles that they read was falsified and that there is no 
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evidence to support the notion that gender differences in logical reasoning exist.  They 
explained that the true purpose of the study was to see how the explanatory information 
about gender stereotypes would affect performance on a difficult test.  Participants were 
assured that the test they completed was highly difficult (i.e., from a GRE preparation 
book) and was not something that would have been possible to complete in the amount of 
time they were given—this unrealistic time limit was an intentional and critical part of 
the study.  Participants were welcomed to ask any questions of the researcher regarding 
the experiment. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
To ascertain that the attributional stereotype manipulation was successful, a 
manipulation check was performed.  One manipulation check item stated “There are no 
gender differences in logical reasoning,” to which participants had to respond true or 
false.  There were 3 participants in the no stereotype condition that answered “false” to 
this question, and were therefore excluded from further analyses.   
The second critical manipulation check item required participants to select the 
correct multiple choice response to the question “Gender differences in logical reasoning 
exist because…”  Several participants answered this item incorrectly: 3 in the I/C 
condition, 8 in the E/UC condition, and 1 in the I/UC condition.  The individual who 
responded incorrectly in the I/UC condition cited effort as the cause, whereas all of those 
participants who responded incorrectly in the I/C and E/UC conditions indicated that 
differences in innate ability were the cause of the proposed gender gap in logical 
reasoning.  This large number of incorrect responses may be due to a general tendency 
for people to assume dispositional attributions rather than situational ones.  Particularly 
for the E/UC group, they may have thought that differential treatment awarded to boys 
and girls may be based on an actual inherent difference, causing them to cite this 
attribution as driving the gender gap.  Again, all participants who answered incorrectly to 
this item were excluded from the analyses1, reducing the overall number of participants to 
                                                        
1
 Analyses were also conducted with all participants included.  Unless otherwise noted, 
the patterns are consistent with what is reported. 
 
 
28
55 and the number of participants per condition as follows: No stereotype = 14; I/C = 14; 
E/UC = 10; I/UC = 17.  
Performance 
The first experimental hypothesis stated that participants would differ in 
performance on the logical reasoning test based on attribution condition.  Specifically, it 
was expected that those in the no stereotype and I/C conditions would perform at the 
highest levels, those in the I/UC would have the worst performance, and finally that those 
in the E/UC condition would fall somewhere between the I/C and I/UC groups in 
performance.  To test this first hypothesis, the number of correct responses, number of 
attempted responses, and the ratio of correct over attempted responses were examined 
between groups (see Table 1).  Because the of the large standard deviations present in 
each of the performance outcomes, a square root transformation was applied before 
conducting the appropriate analyses.  Unless otherwise noted, the results remained the 
same with this transformation applied. 
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed that there was no significant 
difference in the number of problems that were attempted by participants, F(3, 51) = 
1.31, p  = .28.  To determine if there were any differences between groups in the 
frequency of attempted problem, a chi-square analysis was performed and did not reveal 
an overall difference, χ(24) = 50.06, p = .39.  Similarly, there was no overall effect for the 
number of correct responses, F(3, 51) = .40, p = .76.   
 
 
29
However, there was a marginal effect for the ratio of correct to attempted 
responses, F(3, 51) = 1.99, p = .13 (see Figure 1)2.  When a square root transformation is 
applied, the differences between groups becomes slightly stronger, but is still marginally 
significant, F(3, 51) = 2.22, p = .10 (see Figure 2).  Contrary to what was hypothesized, 
those in the I/C condition had the lowest levels of performance (M = 34.76, SD = 19.94), 
which was marginally significantly worse than that of the E/UC group (M = 51.60, SD = 
25.60).  The I/UC group also had performance levels higher than expected (M = 46.90, 
SD = 15.24), greater than those of the no stereotype group (M = 42.84, SD = 11.41). 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Means and standard deviations of the number of attempted/correct problems 
 
  Problems Attempted Correct Answers 
 Raw Score Sq. Rt. Trans. Raw Score Sq. Rt. Trans. 
No Stereotype 16.79 (4.56) 4.06 (0.57) 6.93 (1.98) 2.61 (0.38) 
I/C 19.21 (4.28) 4.36 (0.51) 6.50 (3.57) 2.48 (0.62) 
E/UC 16.30 (5.83) 3.97 (0.75) 7.90 (4.33) 2.73 (0.72) 
I/UC 15.88 (5.13) 3.93 (0.65) 7.06 (2.66) 2.62 (0.48) 
Total 17.04 (4.97) 4.08 (0.63) 7.04 (3.07) 2.60 (0.54) 
Note. Sq. Rt. Trans. = square root transformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2
 This omnibus test becomes significant when all participants are analyzed using the 
square root transformation, F(3, 69) = 3.28, p = .03, as well as the difference between the 
I/UC and I/C groups (p = .02). 
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Table 2  
Frequencies of problems attempted and correct by group 
  
    Frequency 
  
  M (SD) 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 
Problems Attempted 
     
No Stereotype 16.79 (4.56) 0 1 4 6 3 
I/C (Effort) 19.21 (4.28) 0 1 1 6 6 
E/UC (Society) 16.30 (5.83) 0 1 5 2 2 
I/UC (Ability) 15.88 (5.13) 0 3 4 8 2 
  Total   0 6 14 22 13 
Problems Correct 
No Stereotype 6.93 (1.98) 5 9 0 0 0 
I/C (Effort) 6.50 (3.57) 7 9 0 0 0 
E/UC (Society) 7.90 (4.33) 3 5 1 1 0 
I/UC (Ability) 7.06 (2.66) 7 4 2 0 0 
  Total 7.04 (3.07) 22 27 3 1 0 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Ratio of number of problems correct over number of problems attempted (raw 
data). 
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Figure 2. Ratio of number of problems correct over number of problems attempted 
(values after square root transformation). 
 
Therefore, it appears that despite having an internal and controllable attribution 
that suggests sufficient effort can eliminate gender differences, participants in this 
condition performed the worst in terms of correct relative to attempted items.  However, 
although this hypothesis was not supported, it does appear that the I/C group attempted 
the most number of problems (albeit not significantly more than other groups), which 
suggests that participants were working on more problems, but that accuracy was 
compromised as a result.  These results are questionable, however, given the small 
sample sizes within each condition and the resulting variability within each group on the 
different measures. 
Persistence 
 In addition to differing in performance, it was also hypothesized that participants 
would differ in the degree to which they chose to persist depending on the attributional 
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signature of the stereotype.  Similar to the performance hypotheses, it was anticipated 
that those in the no stereotype and I/C condition would have the greatest rates of 
persistence because of no threat being applied and the controllable nature of the 
attribution, respectively.  It was also expected that participants in the I/UC condition 
would persist the least, given the immutability implied by this type of attribution 
(uncontrollable).  Again, the E/UC group was thought to be in between the I/UC and I/C 
conditions in terms of persistence. 
 An overall ANOVA revealed no significant differences between groups in the 
average number of problems attempted when given the opportunity to persist on the task, 
F(3, 51) = .26, p = .85.  In addition, a chi-square analysis was conducted to determine 
whether participants in each group differed in the frequency of attempted problems 
(ranging from 0 to 8).  This difference was also non-significant, χ2(24) = 14.53, p = .93, 
indicating that the number of problems participants were attempting did not differ 
between groups (see Table 3 for means, standard deviations, and frequencies).  The 
pattern of responses do seem to differ slightly between groups, however, so a median 
split was applied to the frequency to determine if groups differed in the number of 
participants persisting on a low (0-4) versus high (5-8) number of problems.  This test 
was also non-significant, χ2(3) = 4.35, p = .23.  However, the frequencies do suggest that 
those in the E/UC group are mostly persisting on a high number of problems compared to 
those in the I/UC group, who tended to fall at the low end of the spectrum, with those in 
the I/C group falling in the middle to high end. 
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Table 3 
 
Means, standard deviations, and frequencies for number of additional problems 
attempted 
 
    Number Attempted 
  M (SD) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No Stereotype 4.36 (2.47) 2 0 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 
I/C (Effort) 3.86 (2.74) 3 1 0 1 3 2 1 2 1 
E/UC (Society) 4.40 (2.72) 2 0 1 0 0 2 3 2 0 
I/UC (Ability) 3.71 (2.31) 2  1 2 2  5  2  0  2  1  
Total                     
  
In addition to actual persistence behavior, a single continuous persistence item 
was examined to see if participants differed in how much they would expect themselves 
to continue on the task if given the chance: “If you could continue on this task, how likely 
is it that you would continue? (1 = very probably not, 7 = definitely).”  There was a slight 
overall difference in response to this item (F(3, 51) = 1.91, p = .14), which was driven by 
a marginally significant difference between the I/UC group (M = 4.82, SD = 1.70) and the 
I/C group (M = 3.29, SD = 1.68; Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3. Mean responses by group on desire to persist. 
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These results were inconsistent with the hypothesis, but may be explained by 
motivated reactance by the I/UC group.  When confronted with an extreme attribution 
that implies that a given stereotype is permanent and not susceptible to change, 
participants may disagree with the proposed reasoning and react to combat it, minimizing 
its ability to explain the stereotype.  This explanation may also be pertinent to the E/UC 
condition, given that an uncontrollable cause is posited, participants may be particularly 
motivated to react against such an extreme claim by persisting to a greater extent.  It is 
also possible that those in the I/C group did not desire to persist because they had already 
gone through all of the items.  As stated previously, the participants in this group 
attempted the most number of problems overall and by the time they had also completed 
the persistence measure, may not have had any problems left on which to persist. 
Self Efficacy 
 Participants’ self efficacy was also expected to differ based on attribution 
condition.  Self efficacy was hypothesized to be preserved in the no stereotype group 
because there was no explicit threat.  A similar result was anticipated for the I/C 
condition, where self efficacy would not be affected because one’s ability to perform the 
logical reasoning task is being presented as controllable.  However, the I/UC attribution 
was predicted to have the most negative impact on self-efficacy since it implies that the 
cause is within the individual, but also not susceptible to change, which could lead to 
reduced performance expectancies among participants in this group.  In contrast, the 
E/UC condition was expected to have little to no change in self efficacy because of the 
external locus implied by the attribution: although the stereotype is affecting women as a 
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group, the reasoning behind the gender gap does not have to do with the individual per se, 
but rather the behavior of society members as a whole. 
 First, differences in pre-test self efficacy were analyzed.  An ANOVA revealed 
that there were no overall differences in how participants felt about their logical 
reasoning abilities, F(3, 51) = .71, p = .55.  Similarly, there were no differences in this 
measure after the test had been completed, F(3, 51) = .88, p = .46 (see Table 4 for self 
efficacy means and standard deviations).  A repeated measures analysis was also 
conducted to see if self-efficacy changed significantly within groups from pre- to post-
test.  Because the items for these two measures used different scales, responses were re-
coded into z-scores so that they could be compared.  There was no main effect of time 
(pre/post), F(1, 51) = .01, p = .92 or a time by condition interaction, F(3,51) = .20, p = 
.90 (see Figure 2).  These results indicate that self-efficacy was largely unaffected by the 
manipulations or by the testing situation itself.  It is possible that this is an artifact of the 
novelty of this task, such that none of the participants felt very certain how they would 
perform, irrespective of the specific condition to which they were assigned. 
 
Table 4 
Means and standard deviations of self-efficacy pre- and post-test 
  Pre-test Post-test 
No Stereotype 3.49 (.61) 3.11 (1.42) 
I/C (Effort) 3.63 (.59) 3.64 (1.01) 
E/UC (Society) 3.76 (.63) 3.88 (1.45) 
I/UC (Ability) 3.79 (.65) 3.66 (1.12) 
Total 3.67 (.61) 3.56 (1.24) 
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Figure 4. Standardized comparison of pre- and post-test self efficacy scores. 
 
Domain Identification 
 The degree to which participants remain identified with logical reasoning as a 
domain that is important to their self-concept was expected to differ between groups.  
There was no difference expected in domain identification initially because it was 
measured before the manipulation or any other measures.  However, after the 
manipulation and testing experience, participants were expected to diverge from one 
another in how much they identified with logical reasoning as a domain. 
 As anticipated, the pre-test measure of domain identification did not differ 
between groups and mean levels were above the midpoint for all groups, F(3, 51) = 1.08, 
p = .37.  However, contrary to what was hypothesized, there were no overall differences 
between groups during the post-test evaluation of domain identification, F(3, 51) = 1.28, 
p = .29 (see Table 5).  A repeated measures analysis was also conducted to determine if 
there were within-group changes between pre-and post-testing sessions.  There was an 
overall main effect of time, F(1, 51) = 61.83, p < .01, indicating that in general, 
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participants’ level of domain identification significantly decreased from pre- to post-test.  
The time by condition interaction was not significant, F(3, 51) = 1.64, p = .19, but the 
largest drop in domain identification from pre- to post-test occurred in the no stereotype 
condition (see Figure 3). 
 
Table 5 
Means and standard deviations of domain identification pre- and post-test. 
  
Pre-test 
M (SD) 
Post-test 
M (SD) 
Mean Difference 
[95% CI] 
No Stereotype 5.77 (.78) 4.27 (1.16) 1.50 [.99, 2.01] 
I/C (Effort) 5.94 (.53) 5.16 (1.24) .77 [.28, 1.30] 
E/UC (Society) 5.60 (1.02) 4.80 (1.48) .80 [.97, 1.4] 
I/UC (Ability) 5.47 (.73) 4.45 (1.36) 1.02 [.56, 1.49] 
Total  5.69 (.76) 4.65 (1.31)   
Note. All pre- to post-test differences are significant, p < .01. 
 
 
Figure 5. Domain identification pre- and post-test.  
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Although there was an overall decrease among all of the groups in domain 
identification from pre- to post-test, this could be an artifact of depletion, given that this 
measure was completed at the end of an arduous testing session.  As anticipated, the I/UC 
group had one of the largest drops in domain identification from pre- to post-test.  
Furthermore, the largest drop occurred in the no stereotype condition, which is not 
consistent with the original hypotheses.  It could be that those who were told that men 
and women are equal, but then experienced a struggle with the difficult test, saw the 
greatest contrast between how they were expected to perform and how they actually 
thought they did on the test.  This may have in turn led to a pattern of disidentification 
with the domain so as to preserve their self-concept while explaining the less than 
desirable performance.  Another reason why this group may have exhibited the lowest 
post-test domain identification is because the other groups were reacting against the 
negative stereotype and therefore sought to maintain identification in order to discount 
the stereotype or corresponding attribution. 
Additional Analyses 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to indicate their personal 
attributions for logical reasoning abilities.  All items were measured on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale (see Figure 5).  When asked how much they agreed 
with the statement “Logical reasoning is something you are born with,” participants were 
significantly different in their responses (F(3, 51) = 4.78, p < .01), with those in the no 
stereotype group (M = 4.21, SD = 1.25)  and I/UC  (M = 3.94, SD = 1.48) endorsing this 
significantly and marginally significantly more, respectively, than those in the E/UC (M = 
2.50, SD = 1.35) and I/C (M = 2.71, SD = 1.54) groups (see Figure 6).  When responses 
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to this question were analyzed with all participants included (not excluding based on 
manipulation check accuracy), this difference became non-significant, F(3, 69) = 1.29, p 
= .26 (see Figure 7).  This change appears to be due to those in the E/UC group endorsing 
this attribution more (M = 3.50, SD = 1.82) than when some subjects were excluded (M = 
2.50, SD = 1.35).  This reflects the excluded participants’ tendancy to indicate that 
according to the article they read, gender differences were innate, rather than the 
attribution that was actually given to them (E/UC). 
In regards to the statement “Logical reasoning skills can be achieved with practice 
and effort,” there was a marginally significant difference in responses (F(3, 51) = 1.87, p 
= .15), where the largest difference is between those in the I/C (effort; M = 6.57, SD = 
.76) and I/UC (ability; M = 6.00, SD = .79) conditions, consistent with the manipulation.  
This difference becomes stronger when all participants are included in the analyses, F(3, 
69) = 2.34, p = .08, with slight decreases in the average endorsement of the no stereotype 
(M = 5.79, SD = 1.62) and E/UC groups (M = 6.33, SD = 0.59) and a slight increase 
among those in the I/C group (M = 6.05, SD = 0.78). 
There was a significant difference in endorsement of the statement “Gender 
differences in logical reasoning are due to discouragement of women by society,” (F(3, 
51) = 4.38, p < .01).  Those in the no stereotype group displaying significantly more 
agreement (M = 6.00, SD = 1.11) than those in the I/C (M = 4.14, SD = 1.61) and I/UC 
(M = 4.41, SD = 1.37) groups and marginally significantly more than those in the E/UC 
group (M = 4.80, SD = 1.87).  However, when considering all participants, this difference 
becomes marginal, F(3, 69) = 2.37, p = .08, which is driven by slight decreases among 
the no stereotype (M = 5.63, SD = 1.74) and E/UC (M = 4.67, SD = 1.78) groups and 
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slight increases among those in the I/C (M = 4.24, SD = 1.72) and I/UC (M = 5.58, SD = 
1.43) groups. 
Finally, when faced with the statement “Men and women are equal in logical 
reasoning,” there were significantly different responses across groups (F(3, 51) = 7.78, p 
< .001), with those in the no stereotype group (M = 6.71, SD = .47) endorsing this 
significantly more than the I/C (M = 4.36, SD = 1.99) and I/UC (M = 4.65, SD = 1.54) 
groups.  Those in E/UC group (M = 5.80, SD = 1.40) had marginally significantly more 
endorsement than those in the I/C group.  This pattern remained the same, but was 
slightly weaker, when all participants were included in the analysis, F(3, 69) = 3.01, p = 
.04. 
 
 
Figure 6. Post-test endorsement of logical reasoning attributions by condition.  
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Figure 7. Post-test endorsement of logical reasoning attributions by condition (all 
participants included in analysis). 
 
It appears that the no stereotype group was endorsing several different 
attributions, indicating that although they believe men and women are equal in logical 
reasoning, there are still differences due to societal influences, but these differences can 
be minimized with effort.  However, they also somewhat endorsed the notion that logical 
reasoning is something people are born with.  Across all conditions, however, 
participants were strongly endorsing the idea that logical reasoning can be achieved with 
practice and effort, which is encouraging given that this attribution implies controllable 
causes to the perceived gender gap, making it possible to combat over time.  However, as 
discussed in the performance and persistence results, endorsement of this type of 
attribution does not necessarily lead to a universal form of success, and may lead some to 
favor completion of a task over accuracy in completing a task. 
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 To determine if participants’ attributions for logical reasoning were related to 
their actual performance measures (i.e., number of problems attempted, correct, ratio), 
simple correlations were calculated (Table 6).  There was a significant negative 
correlation between the number of problems that were attempted on the test and 
participants’ endorsement of the statement “Men and women are equal in their logical 
reasoning abilities,” r = -.24, p = .08.  This would suggest that the fewer problems that 
were attempted, the more participants believed the nullified stereotype.  This may be 
related to the ability of those participants who did attempt fewer problems (I/UC, E/UC 
groups) to capitalize on their accuracy, making them feel more confident that women and 
men are in fact equal in logical reasoning abilities.  There was also a marginally 
significant positive correlation between endorsement of the notion that men and women 
are equal in logical reasoning and the number of problems that were attempted in the 
persistence measure, indicating that those who persisted more were also more likely to 
believe that men and women are equal (r = .23, p = .02).  Although there were no 
significant differences between groups in the number of problems attempted when given 
the chance to persist, those who did persist more may have felt more confident about their 
performance given that they were able to complete more of the problems.  This may have 
bolstered their impressions of women’s logical reasoning performance in general. 
 Finally, the more problems on which the participants persisted, the more they 
endorsed the sentiment that logical reasoning can be achieved with practice and effort (r 
= .25, p = .02). This relationship makes sense given that those who actually put forth 
more effort when given the chance more strongly believe that their effort will pay off. 
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Table 6 
Correlations between attribution endorsement and achievement outcomes 
Post-test Attribution Endorsement 
  Born With LR LR with effort 
Discouragement 
from society 
Men and 
Women Equal 
Correct Answers .06 -.06 -.01 .03 
Number Attempted .00 -.06 .12 -.24* 
Ratio correct/attempted .10 -.01 -.10 .18 
Number Persisted -.10 .25* -.08 .23* 
Desire to Continue .12 .14 .14 .09 
Note. p < .10* 
 
 
 However, different associations emerged when all participants were included in 
the analysis (see Table 7).  First, the correlations that were significant as stated above 
became non-significant when all responses were considered.  In addition, there came to 
be signfiicant correlations between desire to continue on the test (continuous persistence 
item) and beliefs that logial reasoning can be achieved with practice and effort (r = .21, p 
= .07), logical reasoning is due to discouragement from society (r = .26, p = .03), and 
men and women are equal in logical reasoning (r = .25, p = .03).  These alternative 
findings suggest that overall, it was the desire to continue that had a greater impact on 
post-test attributions than participants’ actual engagement in persisting on the test.  
However, these results should be interpreted with caution given that they reflect 
responses of those who did not pass the initial manipulation check. 
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Table 7 
 
Correlations between attribution endorsement and achievement outcomes with all 
participants included 
 
Post-test Attribution Endorsement 
  Born With LR LR with effort 
Discouragement 
from society 
Men and 
Women Equal 
Correct Answers .01 -.06 -.04 .02 
Number Attempted -.02 .03 .03 -.14 
Ratio correct/attempted .04 -.09 -.07 .13 
Number Persisted -.17 .03 -.15 .11 
Desire to Continue .02 .21* .26** .25** 
Note. p < .10*, p < .05** 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The goal of the current research was to examine the role of attributions implied by 
a gender stereotype in influencing female students’ performance, persistence, domain 
identification, and self efficacy.  Although previous research has shown a link between 
attributions and stereotypes, the current work applied the attributional model of 
stereotypes as a framework for uncovering the unique contribution of different 
attributional signatures to the stereotype itself.   
It was expected that those who were told that there were no gender differences in 
logical reasoning as well as those who were given an internal/controllable (effort) 
attribution associated with the gender stereotype would have the best performance and 
persistence and be the least affected in terms of degree of domain identification and 
feelings of self-efficacy.  In contrast, those who faced an internal/uncontrollable (ability) 
attribution were expected to have the most difficulty in performance and persistence and 
also exhibit compromised domain identification and self efficacy.  Finally, participants in 
the external/uncontrollable condition were expected to show some performance and 
persistence decrements, but this attribution was not expected to be as harmful as the 
internal/uncontrollable one.  Because this was the only attribution with an external locus, 
self efficacy was not expected to change and domain identification was only thought to 
decrease to the degree that participants were not happy with their performance. 
 The hypotheses for this study were based on both the theory associated with the 
attributional model of stereotypes as well as the many stereotype threat studies that have 
been conducted involving women’s academic performance.  However, the results of the 
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current work depart somewhat from what has previously been found and also suggest that 
the attributions associated with a stereotype have a unique influence on performance that 
is distinct from other manifestations of the attribution-stereotype links seen in the 
literature.   
First, those in the E/UC condition answered the most number of correct problems, 
followed closely behind by the I/UC and no stereotype groups, whereas those in the I/C 
group answered the least number of problems correctly.  This pattern was also reflected 
in the ratio of correct to attempted problems, where the I/C group did significantly worse 
than the E/UC group.  However, it appears that the number of problems participants were 
attempting may explain this unexpected finding: those in the I/C group attempted the 
most number of problems compared to the three other groups.  This critical difference 
suggests that the attributional signatures may elicit different problem solving strategies, 
with the I/C attribution leading participants to complete as many problems as possible 
within the restricted time frame, while those in the other groups completed fewer 
problems, but took a slower approach so as to preserve accuracy. 
These different problem solving strategies can also be seen in the persistence 
results, where there were no significant differences in the number of problems that were 
attempted when given the chance to continue, but the E/UC and I/UC groups desired to 
persist more than those in the I/C condition.  This suggests that being faced with an effort 
attribution may lead to a desire to finish the task quickly, but not necessarily to take the 
time to ensure accuracy.  Because those in the I/C condition were attempting the most 
problems to begin with, when asked if they desired to persist, there were not many 
problems (if any) left to persist on, since they had gotten through the items so quickly.  
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Therefore, this low desire to persist may be due to the feeling that the task had already 
been completed, even if accuracy was compromised, and there was no reason to persist.  
Another possible explanation for the E/UC and I/UC groups’ high desire to persist 
compared to the other groups is a reactance effect against the manipulation.  When 
confronted with a strong and seemingly immutable cause for a gender gap in a task that 
they have already indicated is important to their self-concept, it is possible that a 
motivation was elicited to combat the proposed explanations.  In fact, participants who 
attempted more problems when given the chance to persist showed greater endorsement 
of the belief that men and women are equal in logical reasoning as well as that logical 
reasoning can be achieved with practice and effort (Table 6).  Therefore, although the 
attribution assigned to the E/UC and I/UC groups did not suggest that effort would lead 
to success, these participants did put forth more effort, which was then related to their 
own adopted attributions for logical reasoning performance.  Particularly, these groups’ 
willingness to take more time and carefully work through fewer problems, but achieve 
greater accuracy, subsequently led to more effort-based attributions. 
This pattern is fascinating because it may reflect fundamental differences in 
interpretations of what it means to be successful: is it getting the job done quickly or 
getting the job done correctly?  This paradox can easily be applied to STEM domains in 
particular, where productivity may be favored, praised, and recognized more so than 
slow, but precise steps toward an end goal.  Women who do enter STEM fields may feel 
pressure to perform quickly and to complete tasks on time in order to remain competitive 
with their male colleagues and to prove themselves as deserving of their position despite 
their minority status.  However, this may not apply to men, who are in the majority in 
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these domains and therefore may not feel as much pressure to quickly complete tasks, but 
have the opportunity to take the necessary time to capitalize on accuracy.  Therefore, men 
and women in STEM fields may perceive success in different ways: women as quickly 
completing tasks to prove themselves in a male-dominated field; men as having the 
opportunity to take the time to complete tasks with high quality in mind. 
Furthermore, this pattern suggests that the effects of stereotype threat may have 
different manifestations depending on the attribution that is implied by a stereotype.  
Because this study included attributions within the stereotype itself, different stereotype 
threat effects were able to emerge, pointing to an important distinction between 
attributions in general to explain behaviors or characteristics related to the stereotype 
(e.g., intelligence), and attributional stereotypes that explain why the stereotype itself 
exists.  For example, when intelligence is said to be malleable rather than fixed, 
stereotype threat effects in women’s math performance are typically attenuated (Aronson, 
Fried, & Good, 2002).  When a similar attribution was applied to the gender stereotype in 
this study (i.e., internal, controllable; effort), performance did not result in greater 
accuracy compared to those with an internal, uncontrollable attribution (i.e., analogous to 
an entity theory of intelligence), who were able to more accurately complete problems.  It 
is possible that women in STEM may believe that intelligence is malleable, but also 
believe that women underperform compared to men in logical reasoning because they do 
not put forth enough effort.  These attributions may lead to improved accuracy and 
improved productivity, respectively, in different contexts, each of which would 
ultimately lead to different outcomes. 
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Although the patterns suggested by the results presented here are interesting, the 
small sample size of this study cannot be ignored.  This limitation does call into question 
the results that were obtained and also requires that more data be examined to determine 
if these results and the corresponding conclusions are reliable.  Further research using this 
paradigm may be particularly useful, however, given that these preliminary results do not 
reflect those of typical stereotype threat studies.  The examination of attributional 
stereotypes in a stereotype threat context may, therefore, represent an area of unexplored 
research that deserves further attention. 
In conclusion, although this study lacked a large number of participants to be able 
to completely understand the patterns that emerged, the data do suggest stereotype threat 
effects that are unique.  In futures studies, replication of this paradigm using that 
attributional model of stereotypes as a framework is essential.  With a better 
understanding of these results, they can be more readily applied to the persisting gender 
gap in STEM, where attributional stereotypes may be a primary contributing factor. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The ongoing gender gap in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) 
domains has been an important and popular area of study in recent years.  Although male 
and female students do not necessarily show differences in terms of grades, disparities 
continue to emerge on high-stakes tests, college major selection, and in the workforce.  
Stereotype threat has been cited as a debilitating phenomenon in terms of performance in 
both academic and non-academic arenas and may be one of the driving forces behind the 
pervasive gender gap.  The attributions that accompany negative stereotypes give an 
individual insight into why a particular stereotype exists and may contribute to 
performance deficits.  
In the current research, the attributional model of stereotypes (Reyna, 2000; 2008) 
acted as a framework to explore the specific role of attributions in the stereotype threat 
process and its influence on behavior.  Each of the three attributional signatures that 
accompanied the stereotype had a locus and a controllability component: 
internal/controllable (effort), external/uncontrollable (society-based), and 
internal/uncontrollable (ability).  Each of these attributions was expected to lead to a 
different behavior pattern in persistence, performance, task specific self-esteem, and 
domain identification. 
There were four experimental conditions: one for each of the three attributional 
combinations as well as one where the stereotype was nullified.  The three attributions 
were conveyed in the context of a stereotype that women are not as proficient as men in 
tests of logical reasoning, a skill that can be tied to STEM domains.  After being exposed 
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to the stereotype and attribution, participants were required to complete a difficult logical 
reasoning test.  Persistence was measured by the rate at which participants were willing 
to continue on the test to supplement their original score and performance was measured 
by the ratio of correct to attempted logical reasoning problems.  Task specific self-esteem 
and domain identification were both measured before and after the test, making it 
possible to compare both between and within groups on these two variables. 
The results were inconsistent with the hypotheses in that those in the attribution 
conditions that were expected to be the most negatively affected by the manipulation 
(E/UC and I/UC) actually exhibited the greatest levels of performance and were more 
willing to persist on the task.  Although this finding does not reflect typical stereotype 
threat effects, it does suggest that stereotype threat may play out differently depending on 
the attributional information associated with the stereotype at hand.  Specifically, the 
E/UC and I/UC attributions prompted participants to slow down and carefully work 
through fewer problems, where as the I/C (effort) attribution led participants to get 
through more problems during the time allotted, but this speed came at a cost to their 
accuracy. 
These findings can be understood in the context of STEM environments, where 
success may imply working hard to get the job done on time (consistent with the I/C 
attribution) rather than slowing down to get the job done right (consistent with the E/UC 
and I/UC attributions).  People may gain more recognition and praise for meeting a 
deadline than for passing a deadline and submitting a higher quality product.  Women in 
STEM who are faced with stereotypes about their performance may use different 
strategies depending on the attribution associated with that stereotype, influencing their 
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ability to perform on the job.  If the results of this study can be replicated, they would 
suggest that stereotype threat does not apply to all situations in the same way and that 
attributions associated with stereotypes do, in fact, change the types of achievement 
outcomes that will prevail. 
The primary shortcoming of this study was the small number of participants, 
particularly in the E/UC condition.  In future research, this paradigm should be replicated 
with more participants to see if the patterns observed here are consistent.  If consistent 
results do emerge, a significant contribution to the literature would be gained in the form 
of re-thinking the attribution-stereotype link and how attributions specifically tied to 
stereotypes can influence stereotype threat effects. 
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Appendix A 
Hypotheses 
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Attribution Condition Performance Persistence Task Based Self-Esteem Domain Identification 
Nullified Stereotype 
(no gender differences) 
Highest score on logical 
reasoning test 
Greatest rate of 
persistence (completion 
of extra credit 
assignment) 
Highest levels of post-
test self-esteem 
  Highest levels of  
  domain identification at 
  post-test 
 
 
Internal/Controllable 
(effort-based) 
Higher test score than 
E/UC and I/UC 
conditions (comparable 
to nullified stereotype 
condition) 
Greater persistence then 
E/UC and I/UC 
conditions (comparable 
to nullified stereotype 
condition) 
Higher post-test self-
esteem than I/UC 
condition (similar to 
nullified stereotype and 
E/UC conditions) 
  Higher post-test domain 
  identification than E/UC  
  and I/UC conditions 
External/Uncontrollable 
(society-based) 
Higher test score than 
I/UC condition; may be 
similar to or lower than 
nullified stereotype and 
I/C conditions 
Greater persistence than 
I/UC condition; may be 
similar to or lower than 
nullified stereotype and 
I/C conditions 
Higher post-test self-
esteem than I/UC 
condition (similar to 
nullified stereotype and 
I/C condition) 
  Higher post-test domain  
  identification than I/UC  
  condition; lower than  
  nullified stereotype and  
  I/C conditions 
Internal/Uncontrollable 
(ability-based) 
Lowest score on logical 
reasoning test 
Lowest rate of 
persistence 
Lowest levels of post-
test self-esteem (may 
preserve self-esteem by 
reporting lower domain 
identification at post-
test) 
  Lowest levels of post-
test  
  domain identification 
  (used as self-esteem 
  preservation) 
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Appendix B 
Domain Identification Measure 
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Please indicate the number that best describes how much you agree with each of the 
statements below. 
 
1.  “I have strong logical reasoning skills.” 
     1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
2. “Having strong logical reasoning skills is important for my major.” 
 1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
3. “Scoring well on tests of logical reasoning ability is important to me.”  
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
4. “Logical reasoning skills are important for my future career.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
5. “I enjoy logical reasoning problems.” 
 
     1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
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Attribution Manipulation 
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Large study 
shows females 
are equal to 
males in logical 
reasoning skills 
October 11, 2010 by 
David Tenenbaum 
 
The logical reasoning 
skills of boys and girls, as 
well as men and women, 
are substantially equal, 
according to a new 
examination of existing 
studies in the current 
online edition of the 
journal Psychological 
Bulletin. 
 
One portion of the new 
study looked 
systematically at 242 
articles that assessed the 
logical reasoning skills of 
1,286,350 people, says 
chief author Janet Hyde, a 
professor of psychology 
and women's studies at the 
University of Wisconsin-
Madison. 
 
These studies, all 
published in English 
between 1990 and 2007, 
looked at people from 
grade school to college 
and beyond. A second 
portion of the new study 
examined the results of 
several large, long-term 
scientific studies, 
including the National 
Assessment of Educational 
Progress. 
 
In both cases, Hyde says, 
the difference between the 
two sexes was so close as 
to be meaningless.  
 
Sara Lindberg, now a 
postdoctoral fellow in 
women's health at the UW-
Madison School of 
Medicine and Public 
Health, was the primary 
author of the meta-analysis 
in Psychological Bulletin. 
 
The fact that men and 
women have equal logical 
reasoning abilities is 
widely accepted among 
social scientists, Hyde 
adds, but word has been 
slow to reach teachers and 
parents, who can play a 
negative role by guiding 
girls away from sciences 
and engineering requiring 
logical reasoning. "One 
reason I am still spending 
time on this is because 
parents and teachers 
continue to hold 
stereotypes that boys are 
better in logical reasoning, 
and that can have a 
tremendous impact on 
individual girls who are 
told to stay away from 
engineering or the physical 
sciences." 
 
"Parents and teachers give 
implicit messages about 
how good they expect kids 
to be at different subjects," 
Hyde adds, "and that 
powerfully affects their 
self-concept of their 
ability. When you are 
deciding about a major in 
physics, this can become a 
huge factor." 
 
The new findings reinforce 
a recent study that ranked 
gender dead last among 
nine factors, including 
parental education, family 
income, and school 
effectiveness, in 
influencing the logical 
reasoning performance of 
10-year-olds. 
 
Hyde acknowledges that 
women have made 
significant advances in 
technical fields. Half of 
medical school students 
are female, as are 48 
percent of undergraduate 
math majors. "If women 
can't do logical reasoning, 
how are they getting these 
majors?" she asks. 
 
Because progress in 
physics and engineering is 
much slower, "we have 
lots of work to do," Hyde 
says. 
 
"This persistent 
stereotyping disadvantages 
girls. My message to 
parents is that they should 
have confidence in their 
daughter's performance. 
They need to realize that 
women can do logical 
reasoning just as well as 
men. These changes will 
encourage women to 
pursue occupations that 
require logical reasoning." 
 
Note: This article serves as 
the manipulation for the 
nullified stereotype 
condition
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Large study 
shows females 
fall behind males 
in logical 
reasoning skills 
October 11, 2010 by 
David Tenenbaum 
 
The logical reasoning 
skills of boys and girls, as 
well as men and women, 
are substantially unequal, 
according to a new 
examination of existing 
studies in the current 
online edition of the 
journal Psychological 
Bulletin. 
 
One portion of the new 
study looked 
systematically at 242 
articles that assessed the 
logical reasoning skills of 
1,286,350 people, says 
chief author Janet Hyde, a 
professor of psychology 
and women's studies at the 
University of Wisconsin-
Madison. 
 
These studies, all 
published in English 
between 1990 and 2007, 
looked at people from 
grade school to college 
and beyond. A second 
portion of the new study 
examined the results of 
several large, long-term 
scientific studies, 
including the National 
Assessment of Educational 
Progress. 
 
In both cases, Hyde says, 
the difference between the 
two sexes was clear. 
 
Sara Lindberg, now a 
postdoctoral fellow in 
women's health at the UW-
Madison School of 
Medicine and Public 
Health, was the primary 
author of the meta-analysis 
in Psychological Bulletin. 
 
The fact that men and 
women differ in logical 
reasoning abilities is 
accepted among social 
scientists, Hyde adds, but 
more research is needed to 
understand this issue. "One 
reason I am still spending 
time on this is because it is 
not differences in ability, 
but for some reason girls 
do not put in as much 
effort as boys in logical 
reasoning, which appears 
to be the driving force 
behind the gender gap that 
we’re seeing.  Parents and 
teachers need to be aware 
that girls lag behind boys 
in logical reasoning, but 
that this problem may be 
reversed with more 
dedication and effort from 
female students in this 
area." 
 
The new findings reinforce 
a recent study that ranked 
gender near the top among 
nine factors, including 
parental education, family 
income, and school 
effectiveness, in 
influencing the logical 
reasoning performance of 
10-year-olds. 
 
Hyde acknowledges that 
women have made 
minimal advances in 
technical fields. Only one 
quarter of medical school 
students are female, as are 
20 percent of 
undergraduate science 
majors. "If women utilize 
new techniques and more 
study time in logical 
reasoning, there could be 
even more females in these 
majors," Hyde says. 
 
Because progress in 
physics and engineering is 
even slower, "we have lots 
of work to do," Hyde says. 
 
"This persistent lack of 
effort disadvantages girls. 
My message to parents is 
that they encourage their 
daughter's performance. 
They need to realize that 
women can do logical 
reasoning just as well as 
men with the right amount 
of dedication. These 
changes will encourage 
women to pursue 
occupations that require 
logical reasoning." 
 
 
Note: This article serves as 
the manipulation for the 
internal/controllable 
(effort) attribution 
condition
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Large study 
shows females 
fall behind males 
in logical 
reasoning skills 
October 11, 2010 by 
David Tenenbaum 
 
The logical reasoning 
skills of boys and girls, as 
well as men and women, 
are substantially unequal, 
according to a new 
examination of existing 
studies in the current 
online edition of the 
journal Psychological 
Bulletin. 
 
One portion of the new 
study looked 
systematically at 242 
articles that assessed the 
logical reasoning skills of 
1,286,350 people, says 
chief author Janet Hyde, a 
professor of psychology 
and women's studies at the 
University of Wisconsin-
Madison. 
 
These studies, all 
published in English 
between 1990 and 2007, 
looked at people from 
grade school to college 
and beyond. A second 
portion of the new study 
examined the results of 
several large, long-term 
scientific studies, 
including the National 
Assessment of Educational 
Progress. 
 
In both cases, Hyde says, 
the difference between the 
two sexes was clear. 
 
Sara Lindberg, now a 
postdoctoral fellow in 
women's health at the UW-
Madison School of 
Medicine and Public 
Health, was the primary 
author of the meta-analysis 
in Psychological Bulletin. 
 
The fact that men and 
women differ in logical 
reasoning abilities is 
accepted among social 
scientists, Hyde adds, but 
more research is needed to 
understand this issue. "One 
reason I am still spending 
time on this is because the 
negative messages that 
girls and women receive 
from educators, peers, and 
parents in regards to 
logical reasoning appears 
to be the driving force 
behind the gender gap that 
we’re seeing.  Parents and 
teachers need to be aware 
that girls lag behind boys 
in logical reasoning, but 
that these negative 
messages and attitudes are 
deeply rooted, making it 
difficult to break the 
pattern of inequality we’re 
seeing." 
 
The new findings reinforce 
a recent study that ranked 
gender near the top among 
nine factors, including 
parental education, family 
income, and school 
effectiveness, in 
influencing the logical 
reasoning performance of 
10-year-olds. 
 
Hyde acknowledges that 
women have made 
minimal advances in 
technical fields. Only one 
quarter of medical school 
students are female, as are 
20 percent of 
undergraduate science 
majors. "If society does 
not value women in fields 
requiring logical 
reasoning, it will be 
difficult for women to 
overcome such substantial 
hurdles," Hyde says. 
 
Because progress in 
physics and engineering is 
even slower, "we have lots 
of work to do," Hyde says. 
 
"Society-wide favoritism 
toward boys in logical 
reasoning disadvantages 
girls. My message to 
parents is that they 
encourage their daughter's 
performance. They need to 
realize that unless we start 
to change our minds about 
women’s logical reasoning 
abilities, men will continue 
to dominate. These 
changes will encourage 
women to pursue 
occupations that require 
logical reasoning." 
 
 
Note: This article serves as 
the manipulation for the 
external/uncontrollable 
(society-based) attribution 
condition
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Large study 
shows females 
fall behind males 
in logical 
reasoning skills 
October 11, 2010 by 
David Tenenbaum 
 
The logical reasoning 
skills of boys and girls, as 
well as men and women, 
are substantially unequal, 
according to a new 
examination of existing 
studies in the current 
online edition of the 
journal Psychological 
Bulletin. 
 
One portion of the new 
study looked 
systematically at 242 
articles that assessed the 
logical reasoning skills of 
1,286,350 people, says 
chief author Janet Hyde, a 
professor of psychology 
and women's studies at the 
University of Wisconsin-
Madison. 
 
These studies, all 
published in English 
between 1990 and 2007, 
looked at people from 
grade school to college 
and beyond. A second 
portion of the new study 
examined the results of 
several large, long-term 
scientific studies, 
including the National 
Assessment of Educational 
Progress. 
 
In both cases, Hyde says, 
the difference between the 
two sexes was clear. 
 
Sara Lindberg, now a 
postdoctoral fellow in 
women's health at the UW-
Madison School of 
Medicine and Public 
Health, was the primary 
author of the meta-analysis 
in Psychological Bulletin. 
 
The fact that men and 
women differ in logical 
reasoning abilities is 
accepted among social 
scientists, Hyde adds, but 
more research is needed to 
understand this issue. "One 
reason I am still spending 
time on this is because 
genetic differences 
between males and 
females appear to be the 
driving force behind the 
gender gap that we’re 
seeing.  Parents and 
teachers need to be aware 
that girls lag behind boys 
in logical reasoning, and 
this problem may not be 
reversible if an inherent 
difference in ability is the 
cause." 
 
The new findings reinforce 
a recent study that ranked 
gender at the top among 
nine factors, including 
parental education, family 
income, and school 
effectiveness, in 
influencing the logical 
reasoning performance of 
10-year-olds. 
 
Hyde acknowledges that 
women have made 
minimal advances in 
technical fields. Only one 
quarter of medical school 
students are female, as are 
20 percent of 
undergraduate science 
majors. "The consistency 
of fewer women in these 
domains compared to men 
over the several decades 
points to a hard-wired 
difference between the 
sexes," Hyde says. 
 
"This difference in ability 
really poses a 
disadvantage for girls. My 
message to parents is that 
this gender gap is not 
going to disappear any 
time soon.  It is important 
to encourage girls in other 
areas such as English and 
literature where they have 
typically succeeded rather 
than pushing fields that are 
out of reach and require a 
logical reasoning ability 
that is dominant in boys." 
 
 
Note: This article serves as 
the manipulation for the 
internal/uncontrollable 
(ability) attribution 
condition
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Please answer the following reading comprehension questions pertaining to the article 
you just read. 
 
1. Women have made some advances in technical fields. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
2. The researchers believe there are no gender differences in logical reasoning. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
3. According to the article, gender differences in logical reasoning 
a. do not exist. 
b. arose because of teacher and parental favoritism to boys rather than girls. 
c. are due to inherent gender differences. 
d. exist because of lack of effort among women. 
 
4. Social scientists are in disagreement regarding the nature of gender differences in 
logical reasoning. 
a. True 
b. False 
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Please answer the following demographic questions. 
 
1. Age:  _______ 
 
2. Your current standing in college:    
 A. First year 
  B. Second year 
 C. Third Year  
 D. Fourth Year 
 E. Fifth Year 
 F. Graduate student. 
 
3. In what category does your major fall? 
A. Music 
B. Theatre 
C. Commerce (Management, Economics, Finance, Marketing, etc.) 
D. Communication (Journalism, Media Studies, Public Relations, etc.) 
E. Computing & Digital Media (Computer Science, Telecommunications, etc.) 
F. Education (Counseling, Physical Education, Teaching & Learning, etc.) 
G. Liberal Arts & Sciences (Foreign Language, Geography, Philosophy,  
Sociology, Women & Gender Studies, etc.) 
H. Science & Health (Biology, Chemistry, Psychology, Nursing, Mathematics, 
etc.) 
 
4. Sex: 
 A. Male 
 B. Female 
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State Self Esteem Scale 
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Please rate the following statements according to what is true for you at this moment. 
1. “I feel confident about my logical reasoning abilities.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
2. “I feel as smart as others in terms of logical reasoning.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree  
 
3.  “I feel confident that I will understand the logical reasoning test items.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree  
 
 
4.  “I feel that I have less logical reasoning ability right now than others.” (R) 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
5.  “I feel like I will not do well on a logical reasoning test.” (R) 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
Note. (R) indicates reverse scoring. 
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Appendix G 
Logical Reasoning Test 
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Instructions 
You will have twenty minutes to complete the following logical reasoning questions.  
You may use the scratch paper provided.  If you are stuck on a question, please feel 
free to skip it and move on to the next question. 
 
Questions 1—5  
 
A botanical garden has four greenskeepers: Wilson, Xavier, Yussef, and Zachary. The 
manager of the garden often has trouble scheduling the greenskeepers to his satisfaction. 
He must follow these conditions: 
One or more of these greenskeepers must trim the greens each day, but none of them does 
so for two or more days in a row. 
The greenskeepers work only Monday through Friday. 
 
1. If Wilson, Xavier, and Yussef trim the greens working together three times from 
Monday through Friday, which of the following must be true? 
I. Zachary trims the greens on Tuesday. 
II. Zachary trims the greens on Wednesday. 
III. Zachary trims the greens on Thursday. 
 
A. I only  
B. II only  
C. III only  
D. I and III only  
E. I, II, and III 
 
2. Which of the following is possible during the period from Tuesday through Friday? 
A. All four greenskeepers work together on Friday. 
B. Three greenskeepers work together three of the four days. 
C. Xavier works twice as many days as Yussef. 
D. Zachary works three times as many days as Wilson. 
E. Both Wilson and Zachary work three times as many days as Xavier. 
 
3. If Wilson, Xavier, and Yussef work together on Monday, and Wilson, Xavier, and 
Zachary work together on Thursday, which of the following must be true? 
I. Zachary works alone on Tuesday.  
II. Yussef works alone on Wednesday. 
III. Yussef works alone on Friday. 
 
A. I only  
B. II only  
C. III only  
D. I and II only  
E. I, II, and III 
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4. Suppose Wilson works alone on Wednesday, and exactly two greenskeepers work 
Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday. It must be true that 
 
A. the same two greenskeepers work Tuesday and Thursday. 
B. Yussef works with Wilson at least one day during the week. 
C. Xavier works exactly two days during the week. 
D. Zachary works with Wilson on Monday or Friday. 
E. the same two greenskeepers work Monday and Friday. 
 
5. If a fifth greenskeeper, Quincy, joins the staff and works only on Tuesday, during that 
same week of Monday through Friday, what is the maximum number of greenskeepers 
that can work on Wednesday? 
A. 1  
B. 2  
C. 3 
D. 4  
E. 5 
 
Questions 6—9  
 
An apartment building has eight floors with one apartment on each floor. Seven families 
— the Abrams, the Bakers, the Cabots, the DeLeons, the Elgars, the Fertittas, and the 
Grants — occupy each of the apartments, with one apartment vacant. 
The number of floors between the Abrams and the Bakers is exactly the same as the 
number of floors between the Cabots and DeLeons. 
The Elgars are on a floor immediately adjacent to the Fertittas. 
The apartment on the bottom, the first floor, is occupied. 
The Grants live on a lower floor than the Elgars. 
 
6. Which of the following is a possible arrangement of families, from bottom floor to top 
floor? 
A. Vacant, Grants, Abrams, Cabots, Bakers, DeLeons, Elgars, Fertittas 
B. Grants, Abrams, Elgars, vacant, Fertittas, Bakers, Cabots, DeLeons 
C. Grants, Bakers, Abrams, Fertittas, Elgars, DeLeons, Cabots, vacant 
D. Abrams, Bakers, Cabots, Grants, vacant, DeLeons, Elgars, Fertittas 
E. Cabots, DeLeons, Elgars, vacant, Grants, Fertittas, Bakers, Abrams 
 
7. If the Fertittas live on the second floor, which of the following must be true? 
A. The top floor is vacant.  
B. The Elgars live on the bottom floor. 
C. The Grants live on the bottom floor. 
D. The Bakers live on the top floor.  
E. The vacant floor is not the top floor. 
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8. If the Abrams live on the sixth floor, the Bakers live on the seventh floor, and the 
Fertittas live on the fourth floor, which of the following must be true? 
I. The Cabots live on the first floor. 
II. The Elgars live on the fifth floor. 
III. The DeLeons live on the second floor. 
IV. The top floor is vacant. 
 
A. I and II only  
B. I, II, and III only  
C. II and III only  
D. II and IV only 
E. I, II, III, and IV 
 
9. If the Abrams and Bakers live on the second and fourth floors, respectively, all of the 
following can be true EXCEPT 
A. The Cabots live on the sixth floor. 
B. The DeLeons live on the third floor. 
C. The Fertittas live on the seventh floor. 
D. The Grants live on the first floor.  
E. The Elgars live on the seventh floor. 
Questions 10—13  
 
A chef working at a Mr. Eggs franchise is preparing Mr. Eggs’ famous giant breakfast 
omelets. These omelets require not only the finest grade AA eggs, but also at least two of 
the following specially prepared ingredients: tomatoes, diced ham, onions, mushrooms, 
cheese, and shrimp. These ingredients are measured in cups. When the chef cooks an 
omelet, she must follow Mr. Eggs’ strict recipes: 
She can never use onions and mush- rooms in the same omelet. 
For every cup of diced ham, she must also use a cup of mushrooms, but if mushrooms are 
used, she does not have to use diced ham. 
If cheese is included in the omelet, the number of cups she uses must be greater than the 
total number of cups she uses for all the other specially prepared ingredients combined in 
that omelet. 
For every cup of tomatoes used, she must use two cups of onions. 
No omelet uses all of the specially prepared ingredients. 
She cannot use any ingredients other than the ones listed above. 
 
10. Which of the following combinations of ingredients can never be used together? 
A. Tomatoes and diced ham 
B. Tomatoes and onions  
C. Tomatoes and cheese  
D. Tomatoes and shrimp 
E. Cheese and shrimp 
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11. If one more cup of onions is added to the following ingredients, which of the 
following would conform to a Mr. Eggs recipe? 
A. Eggs, 2 cups onions, 1 cup mushrooms, 3 cups cheese, 2 cups shrimp 
B. Eggs, 2 cups diced ham, 1 cup onions, 4 cups cheese, 3 cups shrimp 
C. Eggs, 1 cup diced ham, 1 cup onions, 1 cup cheese, 2 cups shrimp 
D. Eggs, 1 cup tomatoes, 2 cups onions, 2 cups cheese, 1 cup shrimp 
E. Eggs, 1 cup tomatoes, 1 cup onions, 5 cups cheese, 1 cup shrimp 
 
12. Which complete recipe below conforms to the restrictions of a Mr. Eggs omelet? 
A. Eggs, 3 cups onions, 3 cups tomatoes 
B. Eggs, 2 cups diced ham, 2 cups tomatoes 
C. Eggs, 1 cup tomatoes, 1 cup cheese 
D. Eggs, 4 cups mushrooms, 4 cups diced ham 
E. Eggs, 5 cups cheese, 5 cups diced ham 
 
13. Of the following, which one ingredient could be added to ingredients already 
containing two cups onions and one cup cheese to make it conform to a Mr. Eggs omelet? 
A. 2 cups cheese  
B. 2 cups onions  
C. 1 cup mushrooms  
D. 1 cup diced ham  
E. 1 cup tomatoes 
 
Questions 14-17 
 
Mrs. Gold goes to the local pet store and purchases eight newly born puppies. Before she 
decides which ones to give her grand- children, she wants to sort the puppies to make 
sure each grandchild gets what they wanted. As she starts to sort the puppies she notices 
the following: 
Five of the puppies are female. Seven of the puppies are brown. 
Four of the puppies are spotted in color; the others are solid. 
 
14. Which of the following must be true?  
I. All of the females are brown. 
II. At least one of the spotted puppies is female. 
III. Three of the brown puppies are male. 
 
A. I only  
B. II only  
C. III only  
D. I and II only  
E. II and III only 
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15. Which of the following must be FALSE? 
A. All the spotted females are brown. 
B. One of the females is not brown. 
C. One of the males is not brown. 
D. All the males are spotted and brown. 
E. All the females are spotted and brown. 
 
16. Which of the following must be true?  
A. At least one spotted puppy is not brown. 
B. At least three spotted puppies are not male. 
C. At least three brown puppies are not female. 
D. At least three brown puppies are not spotted. 
E. At least one male puppy is not spotted. 
 
17. Which of the following must be FALSE? 
A. All the male puppies are brown and spotted. 
B. Four brown puppies are all female. 
C. All the non-spotted puppies are male. 
D. All the spotted puppies are female. 
E. All the non-spotted puppies are female. 
 
Questions 18—21  
 
Eight antique airplanes are being considered for storage in two warehouses (East and 
West). The airplanes are single-wing (Dino, Kressna, Bonner, and Lear) and double-wing 
(Rickenbacher, Airheart, Orville, and Wilbur). 
Neither of the two warehouses may go unoccupied. 
The Dino and the Kressna may not be stored in the same warehouse. 
The Lear and the Airheart are owned by the same pilot and must be stored together in the 
same warehouse. 
The Dino and the Rickenbacher are serviced by the same mechanic and must be stored 
together in the same ware- house. 
At least seven of the airplanes must be stored in the warehouses. 
 
18. Which of the following could comprise the total storage of the East warehouse? 
A. Kressna, Lear, Rickenbacher, Airheart, Orville, Bonner 
B. Rickenbacher, Orville, Wilbur, Dino, Bonner 
C. Rickenbacher, Airheart, Orville, Dino 
D. Kressna, Lear, Orville, Dino, Bonner 
E. Lear, Rickenbacher, Dino, Bonner 
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19. All of the following are suitable storage arrangements for the West warehouse 
EXCEPT 
A. Kressna, Orville, Bonner 
B. Kressna, Lear, Airheart, Orville, Wilbur, Bonner 
C. Kressna, Lear, Airheart, Wilbur, Bonner 
D. Kressna, Lear, Airheart, Orville  
E. Kressna, Lear, Rickenbacher, Airheart, Bonner 
 
20. If the Kressna is the only single-wing airplane stored in the East warehouse, which of 
the following must be true? 
A. The East warehouse contains exactly two airplanes. 
B. All the double-wing airplanes are stored. 
C. Both warehouses each contain two double-wing airplanes. 
D. Five or fewer airplanes are stored in the West warehouse. 
E. At least three single-wing airplanes are stored. 
 
21. Only the Dino and one other airplane are stored in the East warehouse. If the Kressna 
is stored, then the West warehouse must contain 
A. the Kressna, Wilbur, Orville, and at least two more. 
B. the Kressna, Lear, Airheart, and at least two more. 
C. the Kressna, Airheart, Lear, Orville, but not the Wilbur. 
D. the Kressna, Wilbur, Lear, Airheart, but not the Orville. 
E. the Kressna, Wilbur, Lear, Airheart, and Orville. 
 
Questions 22—25  
 
Nine baseball players are chosen for the All- Star squad. Four represent the Atlanta team, 
three from the Baltimore team, and two from the Chicago team. 
In the batting order there are 9 spots, numbered from 1 through 9. 
The manager arranges the batting order so that all four players from Atlanta bat 
consecutively, and the two Chicago players bat consecutively. 
 
22. If an Atlanta player bats in spot number 6, and a Baltimore player bats in spot number 
8, in which spot must a Chicago player bat? 
A. 1  
B. 2  
C. 3  
D. 5  
E. 7 
 
23. The three players from Baltimore will bat consecutively if a player from Chicago bats 
in which spot number? 
A. 1  
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B. 3  
C. 5  
D. 7  
E. 9 
 
24. Suppose one team has players batting in spot number 3 and spot number 6. Which 
one of the following must be a player from Atlanta? 
A. 9  
B. 8  
C. 7 
D. 4  
E. 3 
 
25. If the players batting in spot numbers 2 and 3 are from Baltimore and Chicago, 
respectively, a Baltimore batter could also be batting in which of the following spot 
numbers? 
A. 4  
B. 5 
C. 6  
D. 7  
E.      8 
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Appendix H 
Exit Survey 
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“If you could continue on this task, how likely is it that you would continue?” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Very Probably      Probably      Possibly   Unsure  Probably   Very             Definitely 
      Not  Not                    Probably 
Please rate the following statements according to what is true for you at this moment. 
1. “I feel confident about my logical reasoning abilities.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
2. “I feel as smart as others in terms of logical reasoning.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree  
 
3.  “I feel confident that I understood the logical reasoning test items.” 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
4.  “I feel that I have less logical reasoning ability right now than others.” (R) 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
5.  “I feel like I did not do well on the logical reasoning test.” (R) 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
(Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) 
 
6. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
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7. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
8. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure (R). 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
9. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
10. I feel I do not have much to be proud of (R). 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
11. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
12. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
13. I wish I could have more respect for myself (R). 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
14. I certainly feel useless at times (R). 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
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15. At times I think I am no good at all (R). 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
Please indicate the number that best describes how much you agree with each of the 
statements below. 
 
16. Logical reasoning is something you are born with. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
17. Logical reasoning skills can be achieved with practice and effort. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
18. Men and women are equal in their logical reasoning abilities. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
19. Gender differences in logical reasoning are due to the discouragement of women 
by society. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
20.  I have strong logical reasoning skills. 
 
     1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
21.  Having strong logical reasoning skills is important for my major. 
 
 1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
 88
 
 
22.  Scoring well on tests of logical reasoning ability is important to me.  
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
 
 
23.  Logical reasoning skills are important for my future career. 
 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
24.  In general, I enjoy logical reasoning problems. 
 
     1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
 
25.  My field of study (i.e., your major; concentration) is important to who I am as a 
person. 
 
     1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
26.  I enjoyed the logical reasoning test. 
1  2        3       4            5        6    7 
Strongly       Disagree    Slightly       Neither Agree    Slightly        Moderately           Strongly 
Disagree    Moderately   Disagree      nor Disagree      Agree             Agree             Agree 
 
